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The objective of this study is to evaluate the mutual fund tournament, 
i.e., an agency issue between fund managers and investors, in the presence 
of structural changes in an emerging fund market. This study extends 
BHS (1996), Busse (2001), and Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b). A switching 
regression model is employed to investigate the effects of structural changes 
on the mutual fund tournament. We find that structural changes in the 
Korean fund market alter the tournament type from a segment to a family 
tournament. We believe that the family tournament comes from more 
competition since 2005 within large families. Our evidence of tournaments 
is robust to return frequency. Our results indicate that regulators and 
fund families should exercise greater caution than is currently the case to 
prevent conflicts of interests between fund investors and managers.
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INTRODUCTION
A number of recent studies have focused on agency problems 
arising between investors and management companies (i.e., such 
investment advisors as Vanguard Group, Pimco, and Fidelity). In 
accordance with the rubric established by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), investors are considered a principal, and management 
companies an agency. On behalf of the investors, the management 
company must do its best to further the interests of the investors. 
Conflicts of interests between investors and a management company, 
however, may derive from the compensation for the management 
company, which is typically determined as a percentage of fund’s 
assets under management (henceforth AUMs). If the performance of 
a mutual fund is enhanced to a greater degree than expected, more 
money will pour into the fund than anticipated, and thus, its AUMs 
will increase. Needless to say, the compensation to the management 
company will increase with increased AUMs.1) In the case of worse-
than-expected performance, the opposite will be the case. Hence, 
management companies may attempt to enhance fund performance 
unduly, in an effort to increase their compensation.
At the level of fund managers belonging to a management 
company, the mutual fund tournament can also pose an agency 
problem. In this case, investors are considered a principal, and fund 
managers an agency. The mutual fund tournament involves the 
attempts of rational fund managers to maximize their individual 
expected compensations by increasing unduly the risk of fund 
portfolios according to the relative mid-year performance of funds. 
From the perspective of tournaments, Brown, Harlow, and Starks 
(1996, henceforth BHS) are the first to analyze the risk adjustment 
behavior of fund managers using monthly returns of U.S. equity 
mutual funds. They find that, in a fund segment, mid-year losers 
  1) Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) report a convex fund 
flow-performance relation. This implies that high performance induces higher 
cash inflows than cash outflows that could result from low performance. Hence, 
management companies might be quite tempted to increase investment risks un-
duly to achieve better performance and ultimately obtain higher compensation, 
even if such a strategy might be against the interests of investors. Many studies 
have investigated agency issues such as portfolio pumping at the end of Decem-
ber or cross-fund subsidization. [See Carhart, Kaniel, Musto, and Reed (2002) 
and Gasper, Massa, and Matos (2006), respectively.]
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tend to increase fund volatility in the second part of an annual 
assessment to a greater extent than do mid-year winners. BHS (1996) 
find a mutual fund segment tournament that could be considered at 
the level of either a management company or fund managers. Koski 
and Pontiff (1999) and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003) support 
the results of BHS (1996). Busse (2001) re-tests the segment 
tournament addressed by BHS (1996) using daily returns of U.S. 
equity mutual funds, and concludes that the results of BHS (1996) 
are more likely an artifact of inefficient monthly volatility estimates. 
However, Goriaev, Nijman, and Werker (2005) demonstrate that 
tests of the tournament hypothesis based on monthly data are more 
robust in terms of autocorrelation effects than tests based on daily 
data. The study of BHS (1996) is followed by many other studies.2)
Beyond the gravity of segment competition, recently, Kempf 
and Ruenzi (2008a) have emphasized the importance of fund 
family in the relationship between fund performance and cash 
inflows. It is valuable to study fund managers’ behavior from a 
fund family perspective, because the resources of a fund family 
may be somewhat limited and fund managers’ explicit and implicit 
benefits depend on the relative performance in the family to which 
they belong. If a fund manager gets relatively higher performance 
than that of others in the same family, he/she will tend to be more 
compensated, and also more likely to be promoted. On the other 
hand, the fund family will market and advertise selected funds that 
experienced returns that are relatively higher than those of other 
  2) Qiu (2003) and Bar, Ciccotello, and Ruenzi (2008) take a look at the impact of 
managerial structures on risk-taking tournaments. Qiu (2003) shows that man-
agers of funds whose performance is closer to that of the top performing fund 
have greater incentives to increase their portfolios’ risk than managers at the top 
who exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. Bar, Ciccotello, and Ruenzi (2008) 
find that teams behave more in line with investors’ interests than solo managers 
along several dimensions. On the other hand, Oliver and Tay (2008) and Kempf, 
Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) take into account time variation in market based in-
centives. Oliver and Tay (2008) provide evidence that poor mid-year performers 
increase the risk of the portfolio only when economic activity is strong. Kempf, 
Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) also examine the influence on managerial risk taking of 
incentives due to either employment risk or compensation. They show that when 
employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and poor 
mid-year performers increase risk to catch up with the mid-year winners. Huang, 
Sialm, and Zheng (2009) view the risk-taking behavior of fund managers as an 
agency problem in mutual fund industry, which has a very important practical 
implication. They find that funds that increase risk perform worse than funds 
that keep stable risk levels over time.
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funds in the same family. The selected fund’s performance might 
also be improved at the expense of other funds, as is shown by 
Gasper, Massa, and Matos (2006). The concentrated advertisement 
and enhanced performance from such fund subsidization will tend 
to induce higher cash inflows, consequently leading to continued 
higher compensation. Naturally, then, fund managers within the 
same family may compete with each other for possibly limited 
resources. This phenomenon is referred to as a ‘family tournament.’
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b) are the first to attempt to empirically 
test family tournaments via an extension of BHS (1996) using 
the monthly returns of U.S. equity mutual funds. Their empirical 
analysis is predicated on the game-theoretic approach adopted by 
Taylor (2003), Makarov (2005), and Acker and Duck (2006). Kempf 
and Ruenzi (2008b) find that U.S. equity mutual fund managers 
adjust the risk they take depending on their relative position within 
their fund family, and conclude that the direction of risk adjustment 
depends on the competitive situation pertaining within that family. 
They demonstrate that the family tournament is caused by fund 
managers’ investment strategies for salary increases, an advertising 
purpose of their own funds in their fund family, and a cross-fund 
subsidization purpose to their own funds. [See Khorana (1996), Jain 
and Wu (2000), and Gasper, Massa, and Matos (2006), respectively.]
Despite the fairly significant amount of research thus far 
conducted into this issue, many issues remain unresolved. 
Considering the effects of return frequency, this study extends 
BHS (1996), Busse (2001), and Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b) from the 
viewpoint of both segment and family tournaments in an emerging 
mutual fund market. Unlike developed fund markets such as the 
U.S., nobody knows whether fund managers show tournament 
behavior to enhance their individual benefits in emerging fund 
markets. Thus, the benefit-oriented behavior of fund managers in 
an emerging market constitutes an important empirical issue, we 
believe, as different phenomena might occur as the consequence 
of different financial ecologies (i.e., investment mind and practice, 
culture, and regulation structure). In this regard, Korea constitutes 
an exemplary test bed for the study of both segment and family 
tournaments, largely because it has experienced, as recently as 
2004, marked changes in fund market structure and investors’ 
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propensities.3) Following these changes, the Korean fund market has 
taken on the characteristics of developed fund markets in terms of 
investors’ mentality, investment methods, and regulation. Hence, 
beyond previous studies, we are now able to evaluate the effects of 
structural changes on mutual fund tournaments.
This study makes several important contributions to the existing 
empirical literature regarding mutual fund tournaments. The most 
salient of these is that in this study, mutual fund tournaments are 
evaluated in an emerging market, rather than in the U.S. Also, this 
study assesses the effects of structural changes in a fund market on 
segment and/or family tournaments. Furthermore, the robustness 
of mutual fund tournaments is confirmed in regard to return 
frequency.
This paper is organized as follows: The following section briefly 
reviews the Korean fund market. The recent structural changes 
noted in the Korean mutual fund market provide clues as to the 
construction of our empirical model, which is a variant of switching 
regression model. Next section details the data and empirical models 
employed herein. Then, the empirical results are described. Final 
section contains our conclusions.
KOREAN FUND MARKET AND ITS STRUCTURAL CHANGES
With the marked changes in government regulations ensuing 
from the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean mutual fund industry has 
been re-structured into a sound and credible financial sector, and 
thus has continued to attract a great deal of money from investors. 
All of these restructuring efforts built the mutual fund industry 
into a strong competitor to the banking and insurance industries 
in the 21st century. Since the year 2000, investors have been aware 
of the risk and reward structure of equity mutual funds, and have 
been able to distinguish them from bond funds and bank savings. 
To attract new investor money, newly established investment 
management companies have made efforts to aggressively promote 
  3) Korea is regarded as advanced country by the OECD, IMF, and FTSE, but not by 
MSCI. If Koran fund market is now developing, tournament behavior is not likely 
to be observed because of the absence of competitive behavior of fund managers. 
For the purpose of reviewing various empirical results of Korean capital markets, 
see Cho (2007, 2009) and Shin (2009).
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their funds via public advertising. Owing to the Korean government’s 
efforts to develop the mutual fund industry, the aforementioned 
aggressive advertisements, and the favorable performance of equity 
mutual funds at that time, the AUMs of equity mutual funds began 
to grow. Meanwhile, new regulations on banks’ trust accounts 
kicked a great deal of the money therein out, often to mutual funds.4) 
The changing climate of financial markets allowed commercial 
banks to conduct fund sales business with their abundant retail 
networks, thus preventing them from losing their profits. Fund sales 
businesses conducted by commercial banks accelerated the equity 
fund growth.
With the changing structure of financial sectors, public investors 
began to demand fresh investment tools with which to replace 
regular bank savings. To meet the investors’ demands, a few 
aggressive new investment management companies attempted to 
promote their equity funds, and strongly advertised dollar cost 
averaging techniques for equity mutual fund investments.5) They 
succeeded in launching a host of new equity funds that were 
designed specifically for dollar cost averaging investments. The 
other investment management companies soon adopted similar 
behavior in an effort to attract the huge amounts of investment 
money seeking novel financial instruments. At the end of 2004, 
consequently, the demand base of equity mutual funds was strong 
and widespread, and the AUMs of equity mutual funds following 
the preponderant dollar cost averaging investments began to grow 
rapidly, which provoked structural changes in the Korean mutual 
fund market.
The structural changes in the mutual fund market reflect a change 
in financial mentalities, from risk-free or low-risk investments (bank 
savings or bond funds) towards more risky investments (equity 
funds). Fund investors began to be more conscious of risk-return 
tradeoffs, and to evaluate both the advantages and disadvantages 
  4) The Financial Supervisory Commission ordered that the trust division should be 
independent of the main business of commercial banks (i.e., a “fire-wall” between 
them), and trust accounts should follow the regulations of mutual funds at the 
same level. This caused commercial banks to gradually abandon their trust ac-
count businesses. These regulations essentially followed the model of the U.S. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.
  5) According to the U.S. Investment Company Institute, dollar cost averaging invest-
ment is the practice of investing a fixed amount of money at regular intervals, 
regardless of whether the securities markets are declining or rising.
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of equity fund investments. That is to say, fund investors 
familiarized themselves with equity fund investments. We believe 
that the following three factors drove the structural changes in the 
Korean mutual fund market: First, there existed an abundance 
of floating capital, which was generated from Korean economic 
growth beginning in 1999. The interest rate, however, declined 
dramatically from the beginning of the 21st century. This floating 
capital was, therefore, assiduously seeking appropriate investment 
opportunities, such as equity funds. Investors were attempting to 
grasp the ramifications of new and risky investments. Second, the 
above-mentioned regulatory changes in bank trusts kicked a great 
deal of money out of bank trust accounts into capital markets. Fund 
markets absorbed a significant proportion of that money through 
equity funds. Third, the advertisement of dollar cost averaging 
investments into equity funds was an important factor for investors’ 
understanding of both risk-return trade-offs and equity funds. Such 
structural changes made strong impacts on both the rapid growth 
of market size and the quality of fund markets. The rapid growth of 
market size could be confirmed in table 1.6)
As shown in table 1, the total AUMs steadily increased, except 
in 2003. The structural changes in the mutual fund market since 
2005, however, significantly altered the investment propensities of 
fund investors. Investors began to prefer equity funds to bond funds 
more than they had previously, and began to better understand 
the risk-and-reward concept inherent to equity fund investments. 
The third column demonstrates that the AUMs of equity funds 
increased significantly in 2005, which resulted from the proliferation 
of dollar cost averaging investments. Although dollar cost averaging 
investments had not become popular until 2004, the promotions 
and advertisements associated with these investments helped 
them become prevalent among individual investors by the end of 
2005.7) The fourth column corroborates the above reasoning. The 
  6) We ran the Chow test to confirm the structural changes in an econometric sense. 
In the case of 3 (5) large families, the F-statistic is 8.31 (8.56) with p-value of 0.00) 
and degree of freedom of (7,932). Hence the Chow test confirms the structural 
changes,
  7) Prior to 2005 in Korean mutual fund industry, the majority of advertisements 
were generic, i.e., not specific to the promotion of targeted funds. Since 2004, 
fund sales companies began to help investors to understand dollar cost averaging 
investment techniques and promote some targeted fund products by advertising 
via mass media and signboards.
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noteworthy increase in stock market capitalization observed in 
2005 is also attributable to the stock market investments of equity 
funds using cash inflows from the prevailing dollar cost averaging 
investments. Lump-sum investments also increased together with 
the dollar cost averaging investments. The difference in the AUMs 
of our sample equity funds between 2004 and 2005 can also be 
understood via the same rationale.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
This study analyzes daily, weekly, and monthly returns of growth-
oriented equity funds from January 2001 through December 2007, 
all of which were generously provided by the Zeroin and FnGuide.8) 
We use monthly fund returns to test tournament behavior. Only 
when testing the effects of return frequency do we employ daily 
and weekly fund returns. A growth-oriented equity fund is defined 
  8) Zeroin and FnGuide are the largest fund rating company and the largest financial 
data provider in Korea, respectively. See www.zeroin.co.kr and www.fnguide.com 
for details.
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as one that invests more than 60% of its assets in equities. This 
definition of a growth-oriented equity fund is identical to the 
Financial Supervisory Commission’s definition of an equity fund. 
During the sample period, there are 570 growth-oriented equity 
funds, the average total net asset (henceforth TNA) value of which is 
in excess of 5 billion Korean won. Among them, we omit all classes 
of multiple-class funds except for the first class of these funds, as 
well as the funds with abnormal returns when they are redeemed.9) 
The screening process leaves 372 equity funds. Among them, 88 
funds with duration of less than one year are deleted. Finally, we 
have a total of 284 of the funds and all 984 of the fund-years. Our 
contingency table analysis utilizes all 284 of the funds and all 984 
of the fund-years. Our switching regression analysis, however, 
employs only 271 of the funds and 946 of the fund-years, because a 
few families with just one fund each are omitted from that sample.10)
Descriptive statistics for our sample equity funds over the seven-
year sample period are provided in Table 2. The numbers of funds 
and families and the average fund size grew rapidly over time. 
Surprisingly, the average fund size of the largest family in the 
sample increased from 37 billion Korean won in 2001 to 1,389 billion 
Korean won in 2007, which is reflective of an incredible expansion 
of the equity fund market.11) A striking difference is also observed 
in the average fund sizes of the largest family between 2004 and 
2005. The 2005 figure is more than seven times larger than that of 
2004. This might be explained by the structural changes occurring 
in the fund market and the investment propensity of investors, as 
previously mentioned. By way of contrast with the largest family, 
the smallest family evidences no significant differences in average 
fund size over the sample period, as new fund families were entering 
the market each year, and their funds began as small ones. The 
  9) The number of funds that evidence abnormal returns during their redemption 
period is less than 15. Most of the omitted ones are multiple class funds.
10) We followed the procedures of Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b) which used at least 
2-fund families. From the perspective of the family tournament, we believe that 
their method is correct. However, from the perspective of the segment tourna-
ment, 1-fund families should also be included in the analysis. To assess the 
effects of 1-fund families on the results, we conducted the same analysis, but 
included 1-fund families. The results do not differ profoundly from ours, and are 
available upon request.
11) The largest (smallest) family is the investment management company with the 
largest (smallest) AUMs.
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median of yearly fund returns does, however, fluctuate significantly 
in accordance with the volatile stock market pertaining during the 
sample period. The median of standard deviations ranges between 
11.59% and 33.27%, which is generally smaller than that of the 
market index returns.12)
Methodology
This study employs two methodologies that are also used in 
BHS (1996) and Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b): contingency table 
analysis and regression models, respectively. Contingency table 
analysis of BHS (1996) is used to test for the hypothesis that 
segment tournaments exist and persist over a specific time period 
in the presence of structural changes in the Korean fund market. 
Meanwhile, general regression models are not appropriate for 
the adjustment of structural changes to the tests of mutual fund 
tournaments. We modify Kempf and Ruenzi’s regression into a 
switching regression, in order to reflect structural changes in the 
Korean fund market.
To construct the contingency table for the segment tournament 
test, the interim or mid-year return (henceforth RTN) is computed 
from the beginning of January to the end of month M for a given 
12) Each fund’s standard deviation is calculated from 12 monthly returns and annu-
alized. Yearly standard deviation of market index returns was generally 30~40% 
at that time.
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year. Using the RTN at month M, the mid-year winners and losers 
are determined. Based on the interim month M, a fund’s risk 
adjustment ratio (henceforth RAR) is calculated by dividing the 
standard deviation of the second part by that of the first part, as 
is in BHS (1996). The first part of a year covers the period from 
January through month M, and the second part is the remaining 
period of the year. Winner (loser) is a fund whose RTN is above (below) 
the median value of RTN. In the same way, high (low) RAR fund is a 
fund whose RAR is above (below) the median value of RAR. If losers 
increase their fund risks, their RARs will be greater than those of 
the interim winners. 
Finally, a (RTN, RAR) pair is created for a fund within a year. The 
test procedure involves, first, the formation of a 2×2 contingency 
table in which each pair is located into one of four cells: (low RTN, 
low RAR), (low RTN, high RAR), (high RTN, low RAR), (high RTN, high 
RAR). According to BHS (1996), if there is no segment tournament, 
the percentage of the sample population that falls into each of these 
four cells is equal, as the two classifications (i.e., RTN and RAR) are 
independent. That is, the same number of observations should be 
allocated to each cell in the absence of segment tournament (null 
hypothesis). Contingency table analysis is, therefore, capable of 
testing the segment tournament, when there is a fund manager’s 
risk adjustment based on the first part’s performance in a specific 
investment segment. As mentioned previously, we use only one 
segment (growth-oriented equity funds) because the classification of 
equity funds in Korea is somewhat unclear.
Beyond the contingency table analysis of BHS (1996), we use 
the following regression model to detect both segment and family 
tournaments, which Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b) employ: 









         + γ1 ∆σt
m + γ2 σit
(1) + εit, (1)
where ∆σit =  σit(2) – σit(1): the change in standard deviations of ith fund 
returns from the first to the second part of year t,
      Ritf: family rank (between 0 and 1) of fund i in year t, 
      Rits: segment rank (between 0 and 1) of fund i in year t,
      DLit (DSit) = {1, if fund i belongs to a large (small) family in year t                          0, otherwise,
      ∆σt
m =  ∆σt
m(2) – ∆σt
m(1): the difference of median annualized 
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standard deviation between the second and first parts 
of year t,
      σit(1):  annualized standard deviation of ith fund returns in the 
first part of year t.13)
Segment and family ranks are determined as in Kempf and 
Ruenzi (2008b). The segment rank of the ith fund at the end of 
the first part of year t (i.e., Rit
s) is determined by its total return 
relative to the total returns of the competing funds within the same 
segment. Segment ranks are distributed evenly between 0 and 1, 
and a higher Rit
s indicates a better performance within a segment. 
As a next step to assign the family rank of a fund, all equity funds 
within a fund family are ranked on the basis of their segment ranks 
in a descending order, regardless of segment type. According to the 
ordering of the segment ranks, the family rank, Rit
f, is re-assigned 
to each fund between 0 and 1. Like Rit
s, a higher Rit
f denotes a better 
performance within a family. By construction, the ordinal ranks 
within segment and family should be identical. The only difference 
between segment rank and family rank can derive from the cardinal 
rankings, as family ranks are assigned on the basis of segment 




f represent the effects of family tournaments of large 
and small families, respectively. The definitions of large and small 
families will be provided later. If mutual fund tournament behavior 
exists in the absence of strategic behavior, mid-year losers increase 
risk more than do mid-year winners in their segment. Such behavior 
causes the coefficients ofβL
f and βS
f to be negative. On the other 
13) The first control variable, ∆σt
m, measures the effect of overall investment risk 
change in the equity fund market from the first part to the second part of year 
t. Our notation differs slightly from that used by Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b) be-
cause we think they misused subscript i in Equation (1) on page 1021. The sec-
ond control variable, σit
(1), controls for the mean reversion effect of each fund’s 
investment risk.
14) For example, consider a hypothetical family with only three funds, i = 1, 2, 3. 
They have segment ranks of R1t
s = 0.9, R2t
s = 0.4, and R3t
s = 0.1, respectively. Their 
family ranks are determined based on their segment ranks as follows: R1t
f = 1.0, 
R2t
f = 0.5, and R3t
f = 0.0. Hence, segment and family ranks have the same ordinal 
ranks, but different cardinal ranks. As noted in footnote 15 of Kempf and Ruenzi 
(2008b), their robustness tests show that the number of segments does not affect 
the results. Furthermore, our study has a lower correlation coefficient (0.60) be-
tween these two variables than is reported (0.78) by Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b).
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hand, the strategic behavior of fund managers tells a different story 
with regard to the direction of coefficients. As winners expect losers 
to buy more risky assets in efforts to catch up, the winners will 
tend to buy riskier assets. This is a strategic behavior. When the 
number of funds in a family is small, strategic interactions become 
increasingly important. In the case of the strategic behavior of fund 
managers in small families, winners increase risk more than mid-
year losers, and thus βS
f should be positive. Non-strategic behavior 
could be observed in a large family with relatively abundant funds. 
In this case, strategic interactions become less important. A negative 
coefficient is consistent with this non-strategic behavior. 
In the manner described above, βL
s and βS
s represent the effects of 
the segment tournaments of large and small families, respectively. 
Regardless of whether they belong to large or small families, the 
nonstrategic behavior of fund managers is expected in the segment 
tournament, and hence the coefficients of βL
s and βS
s should be 
negative. We expect that the coefficient will either be greater (in 
the case of strategic behavior) than zero or smaller (in the case of 
nonstrategic behavior) than zero rather than just different from 
zero. Hence, we use one-sided t-tests to determine the statistical 
significance of the coefficients.
While the regression model shown above is capable of capturing 
the family and/or segment tournaments simultaneously by 
controlling for each other, the effects of structural changes cannot 
be detected in this model. To incorporate the effects of structural 
changes in the Korean fund market, we employ the following 
switching regression model based on equation (1):
∆σit = α + (βL
f1 D1it + βL
f2 D2it) DLit Rit
f + (βS
f1 D1it + βS
f2 D2it) DSit Rit
f   
        + (βL
s1 D1it + βL
s2 D2it) Dit Rit
s + (βS
s1 D1it + βS
s2 D2it ) Dit Rit
s  (2)
        + γ1 ∆σt
m + γ2 σit
(1) + εit,
where  D1it =
 { 1, if year t belongs to {2001,2002,2003,or 2004}                      0, otherwise                                                      , 
        D2it =
 { 1, if year t belongs to {2005,2006, or 2007}                   0, otherwise                                               .
The other notations are the same as in equation (1). The numbers 
of 1 and 2 in the superscripts of β coefficients represent the former 
and latter periods, respectively. The switching regression model (2) 
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can capture the family and/or segment tournaments depending on 
the time period. If the effects are time-dependent, we assert that 
the structural changes in the Korean fund market have an effect 
on mutual fund tournaments. The statistically significant negative 
β coefficients imply family and/or segment tournaments in the 
absence of strategic behavior.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Analysis of Contingency Table
Without considering family tournament, the segment tournament 
is tested via a contingency table approach here. Panel A of table 
3 shows the test results of the mutual fund segment tournament 
for various pairs of assessment period. Each pair is represented as 
(M, 12-M), where M indicates the month of the interim assessment 
and 12-M is the remainder of the year. As is the case in the U.S., 
segment tournaments are detected in all assessment period pairs. 
The frequencies of (Low RTN, High RAR) cells are even slightly 
higher than those computed by BHS (1996) in the U.S., and the χ2 
test statistics are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Despite 
the preponderance of evidence, our results do not reconcile the 
structural changes in the Korean fund market.
In an effort to examine the effect of structural changes, this study 
tests segment tournament only for the assessment period pair of 
(7,5) each year from 2001 through 2007. Panel B provides the yearly 
results. Surprisingly, segment tournaments are not observed since 
2005, when the structural changes of the fund market became 
substantial. Prior to 2005, with the exception of 2003, segment 
tournaments are strikingly apparent.15) The unreported results for 
15) The result for the year 2003 could be due to the economic disorder in Korean 
credit card companies. At that time, many credit card companies faced pos-
sible bankruptcies because their overdue rate hit the historical record high. As a 
consequence, they were short of working capital, which drove them to financial 
distress. The crisis spread over all economies including financial sector. Despite 
good market performance of the year 2003 (24.40 percent as in table 1), fund 
managers might be afraid of losing their jobs in case of untolerably low perfor-
mance from tournaments. Even in the presence of good market performance, 
Kempf, Ruenzi, Thiele(2009)’s employment risk could be applied to this situation, 
we guess.
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the other assessment period pairs do not differ significantly from 
those of the pair (7,5). Thus, the evidence of table 3 concludes that 
segment tournaments are detected prior to 2005 in the sense of BHS 
(1996), but not thereafter.
To re-confirm the evidence above, segment tournaments are tested 
during both the former (2001-2004) and the latter (2005-2007) 
periods. The break-even time point is 2005. This is the year during 
which we presume the structural changes occurred. Panel A of table 
4 shows the results for the former period, which also constitute 
Table 3. Evidence of Mutual Fund Tournaments
Interim return (i.e., RTN) is computed from the beginning of January to the end 
of month M for a particular year. By RTN at month M, mid-year winners and 
losers are determined. Based on the interim month M, a fund’s risk adjustment 
ratio (i.e., RAR) is calculated by dividing the second part’s standard deviation 
by that of the first part as in BHS (1996). A (RTN, RAR) pair is created for a 
fund within a year. The test procedure is, first, to form a 2×2 contingency table 
in which each pair is located into one of four cells: (low RTN, low RAR), (low 
RTN, high RAR), (high RTN, low RAR), (high RTN, high RAR). Finally, the null 
hypothesis (i.e., no mutual fund tournament) that two classifications (i.e., RTN 










































































































a. (the number of the first part of year, the number of the second part of year)
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striking evidence of segment tournament for every assessment period 
pair as compared to the entire period shown in Panel A of table 
3. The frequencies of (Low RTN, High RAR) cells are significantly 
increased, and the p-values of χ2 statistics are less than 0.1%; thus, 
this finding could be considered strong evidence for the segment 
tournament. On the other hand, the results of Panel B for the 
latter period differ completely from those of Panel A. This provides 
no statistically significant evidence of segment tournament. It can 
be readily understood that the evidence of segment tournament 
shown in Panel A of table 3 is attributable to the strong effect from 
Table 4. Evidence of Mutual Fund Tournaments based on Structural 
Changes
Interim return (i.e., RTN) is computed from the beginning of January to the end 
of month M for a particular year. By RTN at month M, mid-year winners and 
losers are determined. Based on the interim month M, a fund’s risk adjustment 
ratio (i.e., RAR) is calculated by dividing the second part’s standard deviation 
by that of the first part as in BHS (1996). A (RTN, RAR) pair is created for a 
fund within a year. The test procedure is, first, to form a 2×2 contingency table 
in which each pair is located into one of four cells: (low RTN, low RAR), (low 
RTN, high RAR), (high RTN, low RAR), (high RTN, high RAR). Finally, the null 
hypothesis (i.e., no mutual fund tournament) that two classifications (i.e., RTN 
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the former period. According to the evidence shown in table 4, we 
can confirm that the structural changes must have an effect on the 
segment tournament. As a consequence, in the latter period, we 
find no segment tournament. This leaves open the possibility of a 
tournament type change. We surmise that both the strong demand 
base of equity funds and the new investment propensity of investors 
have altered the type of mutual fund tournament from a segment to 
a family tournament.
Regression Analysis
The above analysis shows the existence of mutual fund segment 
tournaments in Korea; however, since 2005, the type of tournament 
has changed. In this section, we are going to study this phenomenon 
in more details. To test both segment and family tournaments, this 
study estimates the regression model of Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b) 
as expressed in equation (1). Unfortunately, as a multiple regression 
model is incapable of capturing the effects of structural changes, 
this study also employs the switching regression model shown in 
equation (2).
Before estimating models (1) and (2), large and small families must 
be defined. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b) use the number of funds 
as a cutoff point (i.e., 26) for the inclusion of a family in the large 
family group. Differing slightly from their methods, we elect to use 
the number of fund-year observations, because the number of funds 
may not be reflective of the size of families in Korea.16) Table 5 shows 
the number of funds and fund-year observations in descending 
order. The rapidly decreasing numbers show that the majority of 
families are relatively small in size. In this study, the big 3s (or big 
5s) are classified as the large ones, and the others are considered the 
16) In the Korean fund industry, it is very easy to establish a fund. A fund can be 
made at negligible cost within 2 days-- in the U.S., by way of contrast, setting up 
a fund normally takes 90 days and an average cost of $100,000. Most Korean 
investment management companies set up unnecessarily many funds which 
have very small TNAs. Generally, the life duration of a small-sized fund is rela-
tively short. Hence the number of fund-years may be a better criterion than the 
number of funds for determining large or small investment management compa-
nies. As can be seen from table 5, however, using the number of funds does not 
change the category of 3 large families, which implies that the empirical results 
are the same as in table 6. We also obtain the very similar results when we adopt 
the category of 5 large families based on the number of funds. These findings are 
available upon request.
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small ones. With regard to the partition of a year, this study follows 
the protocol of BHS (1996) and Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b), in that 
the first seven months of the year are considered the first part of 
the year, and the remaining five months comprise the second part. 
That is, the assessment period pair selected is (7,5). As mentioned 
in footnote 20 of Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b), the empirical results 
would not be affected by the selection of (6,6).
Panel A of table 6 shows the regression results of equation (1). 
When we classify the big 3 companies as large families, only the 
coefficients of segment ranks are statistically significantly negative 
for both large and small families. These results are consistent with 
a mutual fund segment tournament condition over the entire period 
as is shown in Panel A of table 3. Unfortunately, the coefficients 
of family ranks are statistically significantly positive for large 
families at the 10% level, which is a questionable finding. A possible 
explanation will be provided later, in the case of structural changes. 
We believe that family tournament was not detected because the 
regression equation (1) does not reflect structural changes occurring 
since 2005. Even when we classify the 5 largest companies as 
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large families, very similar results are observed. As in Kempf and 
Ruenzi (2008b), the γ1 and γ2 coefficients of the control variables 
possess the expected signs. The statistically significant positive 
coefficient of γ1 implies that the risk change of an individual fund is 
related positively to the risk change of overall funds in the segment. 
Additionally, the mean reversion in the standard deviation is 
represented by the statistically significant negative coefficient of γ2. 
The above regression results do not accurately capture the mutual 
fund tournaments because the model does not consider structural 
changes in the fund market occurring since 2005. To account for 
the effect of structural changes, the switching regression model in 
equation (2) is estimated. The estimation results are shown in Panel 
B of table 6. In the former period of 2001-2004, only the coefficients 
of segment ranks in both large and small families are statistically 
significantly negative. No family tournament whatsoever is found in 
the former period. Unlike Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b), the results are 
Table 6. Regression Analysis of Mutual Fund Tournaments
The dependent variable of ∆σit is the change in standard deviations of i
th fund 
returns from the first to the second part of year t. Rit
f is family rank (between 
0 and 1) of fund I in year t, and Rit
s, segment rank (between 0 and 1) of fund i 
in year t. DLit (DSit) is a dummy variable for large (small) families in year t, and 
D1it (D2it) is a dummy variable for the former (latter) period in year t. ∆σt
m is the 
difference of median standard deviations between the second and first parts of 
year t, and σit
(1) is the annualized standard deviation of ith fund returns in the 
first part of year t.
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consistent only with the segment tournament. One thing that should 
be noted is that the coefficients of family ranks in large families are 
positive and statistically significant. This finding can be interpreted 
as follows: Even the (relatively) large families were small prior to 
2005, whereas the large families are actually sufficiently large to 
Table 6. (Continued)
Panel B: Switching regression conditioned on structural changes
∆σit=α+(βL
f1 D1it+βL
f2 D2it) DLit Rit
f+(βS
f1 D1it+βS
f2 D2it) DSit Rit
f
                       +(βL
s1 D1it+βL
s2 D2it) DLit Rit
s
                       +(βS
s1 D1it+βS




Big 3 as large 
families
Big 5 as large 
families
βL
f1 Family rank in large families in 
2001-2004
.0379 (4.20)*** .0364 (4.53)***
βS
f1 Family rank in small families in 
2001-2004
.0089 (.99) .0032 (.31)
βL
s1 Segment rank in large families 
in 2001-2004
-.0397 (-4.17)*** -.0388 (-4.62)***
βS
s1 Segment rank in small families 
in 2001-2004
-.0220 (-2.18)** -.0179 (-1.42)*
βL






f2 Family rank in small families in 
2005-2007
-.0058 (-.74) -.0049 (-.59)
βL
s2 Segment rank in large families 
in 2005-2007
.0219 (1.66)** .0172 (1.60)*
βS
s2 Segment rank in small families 
in 2005-2007
-.0145 (-1.70)** -.0278 (-2.84)***
γ1 Change in segment volatility 1.0369 (36.26)*** 1.0392 (36.80)***
γ2 Fund’s risk in the first part of 
year
-.2113 (-7.96)*** -.2164 (-8.22)***
 
Adjusted R2 66.33% 66.70%
The number of observations
(large, small) for 2001-2004







a. *,**,***: statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively
b. (large, small): (the number of large families’ observations, the number of 
small families’ observations)
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observe the nonstrategic behavior of fund managers thereafter. As 
a consequence, the strategic behavior of mutual fund tournaments 
might be observed even in large families prior to 2005.
Interestingly, the results in the latter period of 2005-2007 differ 
completely from those of the former period. Whereas the coefficients 
of family ranks are all negative, only the coefficient for large families 
is statistically significant, and not in that for small families. That 
is to say, the family tournament is evident only in large families. 
This is consistent with non-strategic behavior in large families as 
predicted by Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b). Small families, however, 
evidence no statistically significant positive coefficient, which is 
inconsistent with our understanding of strategic behavior in small 
families.17) 
As anticipated, the coefficient of segment rank in large families is 
not negative, such that large families no longer evidence segment 
tournament. Meanwhile the coefficient of segment rank in small 
families is both negative and statistically significant, thereby 
implying segment tournament in the latter period. This could be 
explained by the small number of funds in small families and the 
new entry of management companies into the fund industry over 
the sample period. With the exception of three to five families, no 
clear leaders in the Korean fund market can be identified. While the 
large families possess a large market share of equity funds and can 
obtain highly stable compensation with relative economies of scale, 
the majority of small and new families do not enjoy such benefits. 
To overcome their difficulties, the majority of small families are 
constantly attempting to achieve relatively high performance in the 
equity fund market. The diversity of fund investment objectives is 
not a matter of great consequence for them; rather, performance 
is their principal concern. As a consequence, the number of their 
equity funds is small, and they do their best to achieve good 
performance. Such competitive environments force small families to 
devote themselves to segment tournament, even in the latter period. 
17) Actually before 2005, we think that Korean fund market had not been recognized 
by investors. At that time, even large family was showing strategic behavior of 
fund managers within its own family because fund managers knew each other’s 
behavior within their own family. As a consequence, only segment tournament 
could be observed. Structural changes fueled the growth of fund markets, hence 
even in large families, fund managers did not know each other’s investment be-
havior in their own family. It might cause the family tournament behavior of fund 
managers.   
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When classifying the big 5 companies as large families, we obtain 
very similar results. Additionally, the figures and significance of the 
γ1 and γ2 coefficients are almost identical to those shown in Panel 
A.18),19)
In sum, segment tournaments in both large and small families 
are apparent in the former period of 2001-2004. In the latter period 
of 2005-2007, however, owing to structural changes in the Korean 
fund market, we observe family tournament only in large families. 
This finding is consistent with the non-strategic behavior in large 
families, predicted by Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b). No strategic 
fund manager behavior is detected in small families. Rather, fund 
managers in small families continue to pursue segment tournament 
in the latter period. 
Robustness Test: The Effect of Return Frequency 
The existence of both segment and family tournaments was 
statistically evaluated in the presence of structural changes using a 
switching regression. However, if our findings are sensitive to return 
frequency, these might simply represent a statistical artifact. In 
order to confirm the robustness of our findings, we test mutual fund 
tournaments from the perspective of return frequency.20)
18) We re-estimate equations (1) and (2) without dividing large and small families. In 
equation (1), only the coefficient of segment rank is negative and statistically sig-
nificant. The estimation of equation (2) shows that the coefficient of family rank 
(segment rank) is statistically significantly positive (negative) at the 1% level in 
the former period of 2001-2004, but in the latter period of 2005-2007, the coef-
ficient of family rank is statistically significantly negative at the 5% level.
19) In the above regressions, the explanatory power of changes in segment volatility 
is very big. If we omit the variable, adjusted R 2 decreases dramatically, but the 
same estimation results hold.
20) As additional tests, we assessed the effects of start-up funds and survivorship 
bias. While the tournament behavior evidenced in Panel B of table 6 is unaffected 
by the exclusion of start-up funds from the analysis, the sample of only start-up 
funds shows little evidence of tournaments. This might be due to the fact that a 
lot of fund advertisements and promotion poured huge amount of cash into start-
up mutual funds. Fund investors misunderstood that the old funds were inferior 
to the start-up funds which were designed for dollar cost averaging investments. 
In this context, the fund managers of start-up funds may have little reason to 
compete severely with one another at that time. On the other hand, we know from 
Panel B of table 6 that tournament behavior is not affected by survivorship bias, 
as all the funds are included in the analysis. To further investigate the survivor-
ship effect, we ran the regression using non-surviving funds only. The results are 
quite similar to those of the overall sample. Hence, it can be concluded that there 
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Busse (2001) finds that the segment tournament described 
by BHS (1996) is more likely an artifact of inefficient monthly 
volatility estimates. He concludes that it remains unclear as to 
when managers would take steps to strategically alter portfolio risk, 
and that future research is required to devise a methodology to 
effectively uncover a potentially more complex behavior pattern. His 
sample period of 1985-1995, however, is not the same as that (1980-
1991) used by BHS (1996). Additionally, his analysis does not take 
into account the family tournament. Until now, there has not been 
sufficient evidence to draw any clear conclusions with regard to the 
effect of return frequency on mutual fund tournaments. This study 
attempts to address this issue in order to corroborate the robustness 
of our findings, even with daily and weekly returns during the same 
sample period.
We estimate the switching regression equation (2) using daily and 
weekly returns. All the standard deviations are calculated using the 
daily and weekly returns, and then annualized for use as dependent 
and independent variables. Family and segment ranks, however, 
remain identical to those used in the previous case. Table 7 shows 
reasonable estimates of coefficients that differ only minimally from 
those of Panel B in table 6. In the former period of 2001-2004, daily 
and weekly returns evidence a statistically significant negative 
βL
s1 coefficient, thus implying segment tournament conditions in 
large families. The coefficient of βS
s1 is negative but statistically 
insignificant. The coefficients of family ranks in large families, βL
f1, 
are also positive and statistically significant, which implies strategic 
behavior of the family tournament.
In the latter period of 2005-2007, the coefficients of family 
rank in large families, βL
f 2, are also both negative and statistically 
significant. It reveals the existence of the non-strategic family 
is no survivorship bias whatsoever in mutual fund tournaments. Additionally we 
conducted another robustness test, the results of which are not reported in this 
paper. A salient difference between the Korean (or Japanese) fund industry and 
that of the U.S. is that privately-placed funds are subject to government regula-
tion systems, such as publicly-offered mutual funds. In general, privately-placed 
funds are managed by mandated investment strategies. They need not compete 
with other funds for higher cash inflows or compensation. Owing to such non-
tournament environments, privately-placed equity funds should not evidence any 
tournament behavior. As anticipated, the robustness tests using privately-placed 
equity funds reveal no tournament behavior. Thus, we confirm that our findings 
regarding segment and family tournaments are not simply a statistical artifact.
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Table 7. The Effect of Return Frequency on Mutual Fund Tournaments
All the standard deviations are annualized by multiplying the square root 
of the number of days or weeks in a year. The dependent variable of ∆σit is 
the change in standard deviations of ith fund returns from the first to the 
second part of year t. Rit
f is family rank (between 0 and 1) of fund i in year 
t, and Rit
s, segment rank (between 0 and 1) of fund i in year t. DLit (DSit) is a 
dummy variable for large (small) families in year t, and D1it (D2it) is a dummy 
variable for the former (latter) period in year t. ∆σt
m is the difference of median 
standard deviations between the second and first parts of year t, and σit
(1) is the 
annualized standard deviation of ith fund returns in the first part of year t.
∆σit=α+(βL
f 1 D1it+βL
f 2 D2it) DLit Rit
f+(βS
f 1 D1_it+βS
f 2 D2it) DSit Rit
f
                                           +(βL
s1 D1it+βL
s2 D2it) DLit Rit
s
                       + (βS
s1 D1it+βS




Daily returns Weekly returns
βL
f 1 Family rank in large families in 
2001-2004
.0150 (3.35)***a .0260 (4.76)***
βS
f 1 Family rank in small families in 
2001-2004
-.0010 (-.24) -.0066 (-1.27)
βL
s1 Segment rank in large families 
in 2001-2004
-.0194 (-4.15)*** -.0312 (-5.45)***
βS
s1 Segment rank in small families 
in 2001-2004
-.0019 (-.37) -.0023 (-.39)
βL
f 2 Family rank in large families in 
2005-2007
-.0180 (-2.95)*** -.0216 (-2.94)***
βS
f 2 Family rank in small families in 
2005-2007
.0068 (1.76)** .0033 (.74)
βL
s2 Segment rank in large families 
in 2005-2007
.0217 (3.31)*** .0178  (2.20)**
βS
s2 Segment rank in small families 
in 2005-2007
-.0078 (-1.81)** -.0046 (-.96)
γ1 Change in segment volatility .9414 (110.99)*** .9343 (87.63)***
γ2 Fund’s risk in the first part of 
year
-.0392 (-2.11)** -.0531 (-3.04)***
Adjusted R 2 94.75% 89.81%
The number of observations
(large, small)b for 2001-2004




a. *,**,***: statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively
b. (large, small): (the number of large families’ observations, the number of 
small families’ observations)
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tournament behavior in the latter period, as well. When we use daily 
and weekly returns, unfortunately, the coefficients of family rank in 
small families are not consistent with those in the case of monthly 
returns. On the other hand, the coefficients of segment rank in 
small families, βS
s2, are negative. Statistical significance is observed 
in the case of daily returns, but not in the case of weekly returns. 
The overall results confirm the existence of the segment tournament, 
which is the same as in the case of monthly returns. The daily 
and weekly returns confirm that the structural changes alter the 
type of tournament from a segment to a family tournament, even 
though some of the coefficients have different signs or statistical 
significance. The γ1 and γ2 coefficients have the same sign and 
statistical significance.
By way of contrast with Busse (2001), who report completely 
different evidence with the daily returns as compared to those with 
the monthly returns reported by BHS (1996), in this study, daily 
and weekly returns evidence no substantially different results from 
those using monthly returns.21) Hence, we conclude that mutual 
fund tournaments in the presence of structural changes are robust 
to the return frequency. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we assess mutual fund tournaments in the presence 
of structural changes in an emerging fund market. This study also 
extends BHS (1996), Busse (2001), and Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b). 
Previous studies have left a variety of issues to be tested. To address 
some of the relevant questions, we follow the test methodologies 
of BHS (1996) and Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b), and employ a novel 
switching regression model to incorporate the effects of structural 
changes into tournament tests. Our findings can be summarized 
as follows: First, when we ignore structural changes, segment 
21) To the question of the robust empirical results to return frequency, the follow-
ing efficiency measure suggested by Busse (2001) might provide an answer: 
Efficiency=var(Sm2/Sm1)÷var(Sd2/Sd1). Its high value reflects inefficiency. When the 
assessment period pair of (6,6) is selected, its value of this study is 1.39, while it 
is 47.2 in Busse (2001). We understand that our robust results to the return fre-
quency are consistent with the high efficiency evidenced by the above measure. 
The referee’s comments on this issue are highly appreciated.
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tournament is detected in the context of both BHS (1996) and Kempf 
and Ruenzi (2008b). Second, the structural changes in the Korean 
fund market are observed from temporal analyses of the contingency 
table, and such changes affect the type of mutual fund tournament. 
The structural changes alter the tournament type from a segment 
to a family tournament. Third, in contrast to Busse (2001), return 
frequency has minimal effect on mutual fund tournaments. 
Most studies regarding mutual fund tournaments have focused 
on the U.S. market, and have analyzed why fund tournaments 
occur in many ways. This study is the first, to the best of our 
knowledge, to evaluate mutual fund tournaments in the presence 
of structural changes in an emerging market. We find that mutual 
fund tournaments are not unique to the highly-developed U.S. fund 
markets. Our results imply that there also exists an agency problem 
between fund investors and managers, even in emerging markets. 
The results of this study reveal important economic implications 
for emerging fund markets. As suggested in previous studies, 
tournament behavior is not good for the interests of both fund 
investors and families, as it prevents fund managers from forming 
optimal portfolios and also requires high rebalancing costs. 
James and Isaac (2000) also contend that tournament behavior 
may even impair rational price formation in asset markets. In 
emerging fund markets as well as developed fund markets, all 
market participants and regulators should recognize the hazardous 
effects of mutual fund tournaments. As suggested by Bar, Ciccotello, 
and Ruenzi (2008), team management may be a possible measure to 
prevent mutual fund tournaments, and can also reduce operational 
risks. However, small families may not adopt team management 
systems due to limited numbers of fund managers. More caution 
and considerations should be exercised by regulators and fund 
families to prevent conflicts of interests between fund investors and 
managers.
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